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INTRODUCTION 
Price fixing is antithetical to a free-market economy. Competitive 
markets supply goods and services to consumers at the lowest efficient 
prices. Unfortunately, many businesses would prefer not to compete 
because they can increase their profits by conspiring to raise price. By 
refraining from competition, each firm in a price-fixing cartel can maximize 
its profits at the expense of its customers. Price-fixing conspiracies injure 
consumers by reducing output below the efficient level and transferring 
wealth from consumers to conspirators. Fortunately, cartels are often 
unstable because each member of the conspiracy can maximize its short-
term profits by cheating on the cartel agreement by selling more than its 
cartel allotment or charging less than the cartel price.  
Cartels try to create stability through enforcement regimes. In order to 
deter cheating and to remedy cheating when it occurs, stable cartels need to 
develop enforcement mechanisms that monitor the sales (and prices) of 
cartel members, penalize firms that sell more than their cartel allotment, and 
compensate those who have not received their agreed-upon share of the 
cartel profits. Common monitoring schemes include firms hiring a third-
party auditor or reporting their sales figures to a central cartel manager. 
When such monitoring detects deviations from the assigned cartel quotas, a 











to their cartel partners that have undersold. 
When cartel managers can solve the enforcement problems inherent in 
price-fixing conspiracies, cartels can survive for decades. Depending on the 
size of the market that has been cartelized, price-fixing conspirators can 
overcharge their consumers by billions of dollars. And while some 
consumers are being fleeced, other consumers are priced out of the market 
altogether and denied access to products and services that they would be 
able to purchase in a truly competitive market. 
Antitrust law is designed to deter and dismantle price-fixing cartels. 
Section One of the Sherman Act condemns price-fixing agreements as per 
se illegal. Section One is both a criminal and a civil statute. If criminally 
convicted, individuals face up to ten years’ imprisonment. Corporations 
convicted of price fixing are subject to fines of nine figures or higher. On 
the civil side, consumers who paid illegally inflated prices can sue for the 
overcharge. Antitrust damages are automatically tripled, and successful 
plaintiffs are entitled to their attorneys’ fees and costs. When the threat of 
enforcement of antitrust laws is genuine, rational firms can be dissuaded 
from conspiring to fix prices. When firms nonetheless persevere in their 
price fixing, effective antitrust enforcement can disgorge the ill-gotten gains 
and compensate the victims of the price-fixing conspiracy.  
The success of the antitrust regime depends on courts being able to 
recognize price fixing and to hold price fixers accountable. Unfortunately, 
courts often do not appreciate the mechanics of cartelization. Most federal 
judges have not studied the theory and practice of price fixing. They are 
unfamiliar with the ubiquity of international cartels and the case studies of 
price fixing in American history. More importantly, judges are generally 
unversed in how conspirators structure cartel activities to avoid detection or 
to appear innocent to outsiders untrained in the art of price fixing. This gives 
actual price fixers confidence that they can conspire to illegally restrain 
competition while evading liability in court. 
This Article focuses on the legal significance of competitors buying 
products from each other. Such inter-competitor sales stabilize price-fixing 
conspiracies by providing a mechanism to balance the cartel’s books. When 
one price-fixing conspirator sells more than its cartel quota to its customers, 
the other conspirator firms that have undersold will demand some form of 
compensation. Absent some form of reimbursement, an underselling firm 
may decide the risks of price fixing are not worth the benefits, which are 
now less than negotiated when its partners are not honoring the letter of the 
agreement. If one major firm leaves the cartel, the entire enterprise may 
collapse, and all of the firms may find themselves in a competitive market. 
To avoid that scenario, some price-fixing conspiracies arrange to have over-
sellers purchase products from under-sellers, which funnels money from the 










former to the latter. This can preserve the life of the cartel, improving the 
cartel’s coffers at its customers’ expense. 
If federal judges do not understand how price-fixing conspiracies use 
inter-competitor sales to enforce their cartel arrangements, then judges may 
be more prone to dismiss price-fixing claims or grant summary judgment to 
defendants who have, in fact, conspired to fix prices. This Article seeks to 
reduce the likelihood of that outcome by explaining how cartels use inter-
competitor sales—sometimes called buybacks or true-ups—as a mechanism 
to balance the cartel’s books. Using a combination of economic analysis and 
empirical case studies, this Article examines the critical role that buybacks 
can play—and have played—in price-fixing conspiracies. 
Part One of this Article lays out the legal framework for proving price 
fixing through circumstantial evidence. Because direct evidence of price 
fixing is rarely available, most plaintiffs rely on circumstantial evidence, 
which requires them both to show that the defendants engaged in parallel 
pricing and to present “plus factors.” Plus factors are types of evidence that 
indicate that the parallel conduct is a function of collusion, not of 
independent decision-making. Through the common-law process, federal 
courts have recognized over a dozen different plus factors. 
Part Two discusses how courts have addressed the significance of inter-
competitor sales as evidence of a price-fixing conspiracy. Until recently, all 
federal courts to consider the issue have held inter-competitor sales to be a 
plus factor. These opinions, however, generally have little discussion about 
the mechanics of cartelization and how price-fixing conspirators often 
purchase products from each other as a way to balance accounts among 
cartel members. Nevertheless, the law seemed reasonably settled. In 2017, 
however, in Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,1 a divided 
panel of the Third Circuit—claiming a lack of precedent on the issue—held 
that inter-competitor sales among manufacturers of titanium dioxide had no 
probative value, and consequently affirmed summary judgment for the 
defendants, even though the defendants had engaged in thirty-one parallel 
price increases and other plus factors were present. The Valspar opinion 
risks upending settled precedent, while claiming that no such precedent 
exists. 
Using both economic theory and empirical evidence, Part Three explains 
why inter-competitor sales are inherently probative of collusion. To be 
stable in the long run, a price-fixing conspiracy requires a mechanism for 
cartel members who sell more than their quota to compensate their under-
selling cartel partners. Inter-competitor sales provide an ideal compensation 
instrument because buybacks funnel money from one firm to its rivals 
                                                 











without appearing as suspicious as a one-way cash transfer. Inter-firm 
transactions provide a plausible excuse for why competitors are meeting and 
discussing the price of their products. Also, buying from rivals removes 
product from the market in order to create artificial scarcity and, thereby, 
drives up the market price. Empirically, actual price-fixing cartels have used 
inter-competitor sales to balance their books. For example, in the early and 
mid-twentieth century, the international cartels in dyestuffs and aluminum 
employed company-to-company sales to ensure that each cartel member 
received its agreed-upon shares of the cartel’s profits. More recently, 
modern price-fixing conspiracies in citric acid, lysine, and vitamins—which 
collectively overcharged their customers by billions of dollars—used inter-
competitor sales as a cartel enforcement mechanism. 
Part Four examines the Third Circuit’s Valspar opinion in detail. In 
discounting inter-competitor sales as a plus factor, the Third Circuit 
committed several errors. It is important to expose and explain these errors 
so that future federal judges do not follow in the Third Circuit’s footsteps 
and replicate these mistakes. For example, the Valspar opinion created the 
false impression that no precedents or studies exist showing the link 
between inter-competitor sales and price-fixing conspiracies. It also 
misanalysed the facts before it, for example, by seeming to treat the 
presence of intellectual property licensing agreements as sapping inter-
competitor sales of their probative value. Ultimately, because the Valspar 
majority did not understand how price-fixing conspiracies operate, the 
opinion failed to appreciate the legal significance of inter-competitor sales. 
Finally, Part Five explains how inter-competitor sales are an important 
plus factor that help demonstrate that the defendants’ parallel pricing is the 
product of collusion, not independent decision-making. The presence of 
inter-competitor sales is a plus factor, in and of itself, because cartels 
commonly use them as an enforcement device. Such sales also help 
establish other recognized plus factors, including conduct against the 
parties’ independent economic interests. Part Five concludes by explaining 
how the probative value of inter-competitor sales increases significantly 
under certain conditions, including when the purchasing firm has inventory 
or excess capacity, when the transactions are correlated with the competing 
firms reporting their sales data to each other, when the market is 
characterized by stable market shares, and when the inter-competitor sales 
take place at non-market prices. 
I. PROVING ILLEGAL PRICE FIXING THROUGH PLUS FACTORS 
Price-fixing cartels are incompatible with a competitive marketplace. 
When competitors conspire to increase price, they necessarily reduce output 










below the efficient equilibrium. Consumers are denied access to products 
and services that they would be able to purchase in a free market. Inefficient 
producers are protected by the inflated cartel price.2 Congress enacted the 
Sherman Act based on the premise that “ultimately competition will 
produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.”3 Price-
fixing cartels create artificial scarcity, which means some consumers will 
pay elevated prices, while other consumers will not be able to acquire the 
product at all.4 All consumers are injured. When operating effectively, 
antitrust law helps markets improve the lives of consumers by expanding 
output, reducing price, and improving quality and innovation.5 
To achieve the advantages of competitive markets, Section One of the 
Sherman Act condemns agreements that unreasonably restrain trade.6 An 
antitrust plaintiff can prove that an agreement unreasonably restrains trade 
through one of three legal tests.7 First, the per se rule condemns agreements 
“that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and 
decrease output.”8 If an agreement falls into a per se category, then the 
agreement is presumed to unreasonably restrain competition as a matter of 
law.9 The plaintiffs need not prove any actual anticompetitive effect. 
Second, if the agreement among the defendants does not fall in a per se 
category, it can still be condemned under the quick-look rule, which is “an 
intermediate standard” that “applies in cases where per se condemnation is 
inappropriate but where no elaborate industry analysis is required to 
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of an inherently suspect 
restraint.”10 Third, if the agreement is neither per se illegal nor subject to 
quick-look condemnation, the court will apply the Rule of Reason, which 
                                                 
2. GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION 352 (1946) (noting that 
cartels increase the average production costs in industries). 
3. Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).  
4. Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Damages and Deadweight Loss, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 521, 
524–26 (2006). 
5. Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law as Public Interest Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 885, 886 
(2012). 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  
7. See CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 26–27 (2011) (explaining differences among the three modes of antitrust 
analysis). 
8. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289–90 
(1985) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979)). 
9. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (Agreements that fall in a per se 
category are “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry 
as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.”). 
10. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United 
States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993)). Under the quick-look approach, the defendant 
has the burden of proving that the agreement has procompetitive effects that warrant the court applying 
a full Rule of Reason analysis. Buccaneer Energy (USA) Inc. v. Gunnison Energy Corp., 846 F.3d 1297, 











requires the court to “consider ‘both a practice’s likely anti-competitive 
effects and its beneficial business justifications.’”11 Price-fixing agreements 
are per se illegal,12 which means that such agreements are illegal as a matter 
of law, and that defendants cannot argue that their agreement to fix price 
did not unreasonably restrain trade.  
Because price-fixing firms take great efforts to conceal their illegal 
activity, direct evidence of price-fixing agreements is generally not 
available. Consequently, courts allow antitrust plaintiffs to prove such 
agreements through circumstantial evidence.13 This entails two steps. First, 
plaintiffs must prove conscious parallelism—the fact that the defendants are 
engaging in the similar conduct, such as uniformly raising their prices.14 
Second, antitrust plaintiffs must present evidence of plus factors, which are 
factors that tend to show that the defendants’ parallel conduct is the result 
of collusion, rather than of independent decisions.15 There is no minimum 
number of plus factors that a plaintiff must plead or prove. However, the 
more plus factors that the plaintiff can present, the more likely that the price-
fixing claim will survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment and 
the more likely that a jury will conclude that an agreement existed among 
the defendants. 
Because plus factors are necessary for plaintiffs to prove price fixing 
through circumstantial evidence,16 much antitrust litigation focuses on the 
issue of whether and when certain conduct constitutes a plus factor. Courts 
have not advanced a “finite or exhaustive list of plus factors, and different 
                                                 
11. Sterling Merch., Inc. v. Nestle, S.A., 724 F. Supp. 2d 245, 263 (D.P.R. 2010), aff’d, 656 F.3d 
112 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 909 
(2007)). 
12. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984) 
(describing horizontal price fixing as “perhaps the paradigm of an unreasonable restraint of trade”). 
13. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Direct evidence 
of conspiracy is not a sine qua non, however. Circumstantial evidence can establish an antitrust 
conspiracy.”).  
14. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993) 
(describing conscious parallelism as “the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated 
market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, 
supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with 
respect to price and output decisions”). 
15. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Existence of these plus 
factors tends to ensure that courts punish ‘concerted action’—an actual agreement—instead of the 
‘unilateral, independent conduct of competitors.’”) (quoting In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 
112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999)); Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1232–
33 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[A] plaintiff also must demonstrate the existence of certain ‘plus’ factors, for only 
when these additional factors are present does the evidence tend to exclude the possibility that the 
defendants acted independently.”).  
16. In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 122 (describing plus factors as “necessary conditions for the 
conspiracy inference”). 










courts articulate the relevant factors in different ways.”17 Commonly 
recognized plus factors include: “a motive to conspire,” “evidence that the 
defendants acted contrary to their economic self-interest,” and “evidence of 
a traditional conspiracy, such as a high level of interfirm communications 
that would suggest that the defendants consciously agreed not to 
compete.”18 Other examples of plus factors include that the defendants have 
exchanged price information, that the defendants have proffered pretextual 
explanations for their parallel or suspicious conduct, and that the market 
structure of the industry at issue is concentrated or otherwise conducive to 
collusion.19 The list of plus factors is not a closed set. Because antitrust law 
is common law,20 courts can recognize new plus factors as economic theory 
and the facts of individual cases dictate. 
II. THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF INTER-COMPETITOR SALES AS A PLUS 
FACTOR 
This Article focuses on why inter-competitor sales constitute a plus 
factor that can comprise part of an antitrust plaintiff’s circumstantial case 
for proving price fixing. As their name suggests, inter-competitor sales are 
simply transactions in which rivals sell their products to each other. These 
inter-rival transactions are inherently suspicious because classic 
microeconomic theory informs us that rival firms are supposed to be 
competing against each other to sell their products to the ultimate customers, 
not cooperating with each other at this level.21 
Federal courts have seldom explicitly discussed the legal significance of 
inter-competitor sales. Nevertheless, several federal courts have recognized 
inter-competitor sales as an important plus factor.22 Most significantly, the 
Seventh Circuit, in Judge Richard Posner’s opinion in In re High Fructose 
                                                 
17. In re Pool Prods. Distribution Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 696, 711 (E.D. La. 2013); 
see also In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360 (“The question then becomes, what are ‘plus factors’ that 
suffice to defeat summary judgment? There is no finite set of such criteria; no exhaustive list exists.”). 
18. In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 681 F. Supp. 2d 141, 
166–67 (D. Conn. 2009). 
19. In re Pool Prods. Distribution, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 711; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW 69–93 (2d ed. 2001) (listing plus factors). 
20. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (“From the 
beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.”). 
21. Cooperation among competitors is understandable when each has a necessary input, and they 
need to cooperate with each other in order for either of them to bring a product to market. However, this 
paper and the cases and case studies presented use “inter-competitor sales” to refer to sales of final 
products for which no inter-competitor cooperation is necessary. 
22. See, e.g., In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 681 F. Supp. 
2d 141, 168 (D. Conn. 2009); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 296 F. Supp. 2d 568, 579 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 
(treating evidence of “extraordinary inter-defendant sales of containerboard” as evidence of a price-
fixing conspiracy in the containerboard market); In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 261 F. 











Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation,23 held that inter-competitor sales are an 
important plus factor, recognizing that “[a] seller who experiences a surge 
in demand, but meets the surge by buying what it needs from another seller 
rather than by expanding its own production, protects the other firm’s 
market share and so preserves peace among the cartelists.”24 Until 2017, the 
published precedent fell in line with treating inter-competitor sales as 
probative of price fixing. 
The Third Circuit in a two-to-one split panel decision, however, has 
recently created a circuit split on how courts should evaluate inter-
competitor sales in the plus-factor analysis. In Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont 
De Nemours & Co.,25 the Third Circuit considered the plaintiff’s claims that 
the defendants had fixed prices in the multi-billion dollar market for 
titanium dioxide. To make its circumstantial case, the plaintiff first showed 
that the defendants had engaged in thirty-one parallel price increases over a 
ten-year period.26 The plaintiff then sought to demonstrate that this uniform 
pricing was the result of a well-heeled, long-term cartel and not simply 
market forces. By way of plus factors, the plaintiff presented evidence that 
the titanium dioxide market was conducive to price fixing, that the 
defendants had a strong motive to conspire, that the defendants’ data sharing 
through their trade associations facilitated their price fixing, that several 
internal emails were suggestive of price fixing, and, finally, that the 
defendants’ sales to each other—sometimes at below-market prices—were 
evidence of an underlying price-fixing conspiracy.27 
In arguing that the defendants’ sales among themselves were indicative 
of an underlying conspiracy, the plaintiff relied upon a Michigan Law 
Review article (“the Michigan article”) authored by William E. Kovacic, 
Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx and Halbert L. White.28 The plaintiff 
quoted the article for the proposition that “[i]f one seller buys anything from 
another at nonmarket prices, then a resource transfer is made for which there 
is no reasonable, noncollusive explanation.”29 The Michigan article 
explained why inter-competitor sales at non-market prices and without 
“productive unilateral motivations” represented not just a plus factor, but a 
                                                 
23. 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002). 
24. Id. at 659. 
25. 873 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2017). 
26. Id. at 194. 
27. Id. at 196–201. 
28. William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Halbert L. White, Plus Factors 
and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 408 (2011). The authors’ credentials are 
discussed infra note 123. 
29. Valspar, 873 F.3d at 201 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Reply Brief for Plaintiff at 21 (quoting 
Kovacic et al., supra note 28, at 423)). 










so-called “super plus factor” in creating a circumstantial case to demonstrate 
an anticompetitive agreement among defendants.30 
Both the district court and the divided Third Circuit panel in Valspar 
deprived the inter-competitor sales and the Michigan article of their 
respective probative and persuasive values. Despite the plaintiff’s evidence 
of parallel pricing and multiple plus factors, the district court granted the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. With respect to the defendants’ 
inter-company sales, the district judge held that the “sales [were] just as 
consistent with non-collusive activity as with conspiracy.”31 The Third 
Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the sales volume was too low to cause 
“large shifts of market share,” that DuPont needed to purchase titanium 
dioxide from a rival because Hurricane Katrina had damaged one of its 
plants, and that some of the sales were made “pursuant to a cross-licensing 
agreement in order to avoid patent litigation.”32 Because the decision came 
at the summary judgment stage, the court essentially accepted the 
defendant’s explanation for the sales to be true as a matter of law, denying 
the plaintiff the opportunity to explain to a jury why inter-competitor sales 
are indicative of price fixing. 
With respect to the Michigan article, which explained why inter-
competitor sales are probative of price fixing, the Third Circuit mocked the 
plaintiff for 
put[ting] all its eggs in the basket of a single law review article. But 
that law review article: (a) spends only one paragraph on this theory; 
(b) cites no precedent or economic studies to support it; (c) 
recognizes that patent licensing and cross licensing can be legitimate; 
and (d) seems to limit its analysis to “interfirm transfers of resources 
that are largely void of productive unilateral motivations.” In the face 
of DuPont’s reasonable explanations to the contrary, we decline to 
give this isolated quotation the force of law.33  
Each one of the court’s assertions is flawed, misleading, or both. As will be 
demonstrated below, the Michigan article accurately represented the 
consensus among cartel scholars regarding the import of inter-competitor 
sales. Ultimately, the Third Circuit opinion seems to deprive inter-
competitor sales of their probative value in proving price fixing. By 
                                                 
30. Kovacic et al., supra note 28, at 423. The authors use the phrase “super plus factors” to “refer 
to plus factors, or groups of plus factors, that lead to a strong inference of explicit collusion.” Id. at 396–
97. 
31. Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours, 152 F. Supp. 3d 234, 244 (D. Del. 2016), aff’d, 
873 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2017). 
32. Valspar, 873 F.3d at 201. 











illustrating the practical and empirical significance of inter-competitor sales 
in a price-fixing conspiracy, the following Part seeks to correct the record. 
III. THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF INTER-COMPETITOR SALES 
This Part explores the role of inter-competitor sales in price-fixing 
conspiracies. Cartels need to make many decisions, from determining price 
and allocating market shares, to creating monitoring mechanisms and 
enforcing the cartel’s rulings. Disagreements over how to distribute cartel 
profits can lead cartels to unravel temporarily or permanently.34 After 
agreeing on the profit split among the cartel partners, cartels need a method 
for redistributing cartel profits. Historically, cartels have fined their 
members who sold more than their cartel allotments.35 But cartel 
enforcement regimes based on fines are likely to provide tell-tale evidence 
of price fixing. So, conspirators have developed an alternative 
compensation system that seems less facially suspicious, namely, inter-
competitor sales.  
A. The Logic of Cartels Using Inter-Competitor Sales 
Inter-competitor sales can perform many functions for price-fixing 
conspiracies. Most immediately, such buybacks provide a mechanism for 
conspirators to allocate cartel profits. This section explains how inter-
competitor sales can stabilize cartels more effectively than other modes of 
compensation. 
1. Balancing the Cartel’s Books 
Price-fixing firms invest much effort negotiating the relative market 
shares of the cartel’s members.36 Even when cartel members reach 
consensus on the cartel’s terms, actual sales figures will often diverge from 
the agreed-upon numbers. Deviations from script can occur for many 
reasons. In many instances, firms simply breach the cartel agreement, 
selling more than their cartel allotment in order to maximize their short-term 
                                                 
34. Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive 
Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 164 n.127 (2002) (“Margaret Levenstein 
interprets the largest price wars among U.S. bromine producers between 1885 and 1914 as breakdowns 
of collusion resulting from disagreements among cartel participants regarding the distribution of rents 
from collusion.”) (discussing Margaret C. Levenstein, Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study 
of the Pre-World War I Bromine Industry, 45 J. INDUS. ECON. 117, 135 (1997)). 
35. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 616 (2004) (noting 
examples including in the nitrogen, salt, steel, aluminum, cement, and coal cartels). 
36. See Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64 VAND. 
L. REV. 813, 831–34 (2011). 










profits. Indeed, some price fixers instigate the conspiracy, fully intending to 
cheat on the pact. Many deviations, however, are more innocent.37 For 
example, the cartel managers may not correctly predict customer demand.38 
Alternatively, salespeople who are unaware that their employer is 
conspiring with rivals will sometimes aggressively compete for sales, 
causing the firm to oversell its cartel quota.39 In other instances, cartel 
members may be afraid to decline to make sales that would put them over 
their cartel allotment because declining the sale would look suspicious and, 
perhaps, make the customer suspect that the firms have illegally agreed to 
divide the market.40 
Stable cartels generally need a mechanism to penalize cartel firms that 
sell more than their allotment and to compensate those who undersell. 
Because deviations—both innocent and premeditated—are common, cartel 
managers must monitor sales to ensure strict compliance with the 
agreement.41 When actual sales deviate from the agreed-upon market shares, 
cartel members must balance the books so that every firm sells its cartel 
allotment at the cartel-fixed price. In their study on cartel duration, 
Professors Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Suslow found that one third of 
the cartels in their sample had adopted formal compensation rules to rectify 
deviations.42  
Direct money payments are perhaps the most efficient way to balance 
the books. Side payments reconfigure cartel profits.43 A system of side 
payments can remedy imbalances whether they are caused by cheating or 
                                                 
37. JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 31 (2d ed. 2008) (“Thus, even a well-intentioned 
market-share agreement may be difficult to maintain with great precision over time. Some cartel 
members, despite their best efforts, may overshoot or undershoot their target market shares.”).  
38. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of 
Cartel Duration, 54 J.L. & ECON. 455, 475 (2011). 
39. Executives in price-fixing firms must often keep their sales force and other employees out of 
the loop, lest one of the employees disclose the cartel inadvertently and expose the cartel to antitrust 
officials in exchange for leniency. See Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue 
in Faithless Agents, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621, 1690 (2008). 
40. Some illegal cartels have been exposed and punished because customers faced with firms 
refusing to make sales have reported their suspicions of price fixing or have initiated antitrust lawsuits. 
See, e.g., DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE 233 (2004) (“Interviews conducted in the spring and 
summer of 1997 confirmed our suspicion that something had happened around 1990. Before then, 
customers had the opportunity to purchase vitamins from two or more different suppliers; beginning 
around 1990, however, they found it difficult to get more than one major vitamin manufacturer to offer 
quotes on a particular vitamin.”); CONNOR, supra note 37, at 321 (discussing exposure of the vitamins 
cartel, in part, because customers were suspicious when firms declined to pursue their business).  
41. Leslie, supra note 35, at 611–15 (reviewing monitoring mechanisms used by cartels). See 
also Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1479–80 (9th Cir. 1986) (treating defendants’ refusal 
to sell products to plaintiff, followed by seemingly pretextual excuse for refusal, as “evidence that tends 
to support an inference of concerted action”). 
42. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 38, at 475–76. 
43. Baker, supra note 34, at 159 n.108 (“Side payments are ways of sharing profits. With side 
payments, some firms will pay others, so a firm’s profits are not necessarily equal to the difference 











by innocent circumstances.44 Early cartels relied on side payments because 
of their relative ease and efficiency as a way to bring cartel profits into 
balance.45 For example, members of the early twentieth century bromine 
cartel “provided direct monetary compensation—from one cartel member 
to another—when actual sales were not allocated as contemplated by the 
cartel agreement.”46 When cartels were legal in European countries during 
the inter-war years, the international cartels in aluminum, steel, and cement 
fined members that sold more than their cartel allotment and funneled that 
money to those members who undersold.47 Some modern cartels, such as 
the graphite electrode cartel, have also employed side payments as a 
compensation mechanism.48 A managed system of side payments stabilizes 
the cartel by eliminating the perceived benefits of cheating on the cartel 
agreement.49 
This method of balancing the cartel’s books, though, has the significant 
downside of appearing inherently suspicious if it is detected. Side payments 
generally create a paper trail.50 Thus, side payments risk cartel 
exposure.51As Jonathan Baker notes, side payments may “be difficult to 
negotiate and impossible to enforce given the risk that a prosecutor and 
court would infer an unlawful (even criminal) agreement to fix price.”52 
                                                 
44. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 343, 394 (2011) 
(“Another mechanism is the use of side payments, for example, to share industry profits more equally 
when some firms need to make greater sacrifices or when it turns out ex post that one firm sold more 
than its allotted share of output (whether due to cheating or luck; rivals may be unable to tell which).”).  
45. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 576 n.70 (1987) 
(“Bittlingmayer reports similarly that the pipe cartel made large internal payments to member firms that 
‘did relatively little work,’ and he acknowledges the importance of side payments to efficient 
coordination.”) (citation omitted). 
46. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 38, at 476 n.47. 
47. STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 2, at 252–53 (“Members were penalized if they exceeded 
their assigned quotas; they received compensation for underselling their quotas.”); Philip C. Newman, 
Key German Cartels Under the Nazi Regime, 62 Q.J. ECON. 576, 594 (1948) (explaining the agreement 
among European cement producers to prevent further dips in price by imposing quotas, prices, and 
payments owed for exceeding quotas); Daniel Barbezat, Cooperation and Rivalry in the International 
Steel Cartel, 1926–1933, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 435, 437 (1989) (“The cartel had penalties for production in 
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48. Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary International Cartels and 
Developing Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 
801, 835 (2004). 
49. Id. (“Second, there are side-payments among colluding firms that neutralize any gains from 
cheating. If there is uncertainty about demand that leads actual market shares to differ from agreed-upon 
market shares (even in the absence of cheating by cartel members), these side-payments may occur in 
equilibrium.”). 
50. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 38, at 476 (“However, side payments leave a paper trail 
that increases the likelihood of antitrust prosecution.”). 
51. Andrew R. Dick, Coordinated Interaction: Pre-Merger Constraints and Post-Merger 
Effects, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 65, 78 n.55 (2003) (“But reaching a consensus to implement this 
allocation rule almost certainly would necessitate explicit communications and side-payments between 
suppliers. These types of activities would expose companies to the risk of criminal antitrust penalties.”). 
52. Baker, supra note 34, at 164. 










Louis Kaplow has observed that “[s]ide payments are widely accepted as 
evidence of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, for why else would a 
competitor make a payment to a rival for no consideration.”53 In light of the 
risks that attend side payments, modern cartels seem to avoid side payments 
despite their efficiency.54 Indeed, given the inherent suspiciousness of 
monetary side payments, some cartels that initially employ side payments 
eventually abandon them for less suspicious methods of evening out cartel 
profits.55 One of those methods is inter-competitor sales. 
In terms of cartel compensation mechanisms, inter-competitor sales have 
a major advantage: they balance the cartel’s books and appear less 
suspicious than direct monetary payments.56 Empirically, in order to avoid 
inherently suspicious direct payments, some cartels have balanced their 
books by having cartel members who sold more than their cartel allotment 
make purchases from cartel members who sold less than their cartel 
allotment.57 Thus, buybacks allow one firm to send its rival cash while 
having the patina of a legitimate, non-collusive business transaction.58 
2. The Advantages of Inter-Competitor Sales for Cartel Management 
a. Inter-Competitor Sales as a Compensation Mechanism 
Cartel leaders can utilize buybacks in order to achieve three related 
purposes of an effective compensation system. First and foremost, by 
funneling money to a cartel member that has sold less than its cartel 
allotment, inter-competitor sales provide monetary reimbursement so that 
every conspirator receives its agreed-upon share of the cartel’s profits. 
Without this assurance, many firms would decline to participate in the 
cartel. Some cartels are explicit in their view that buybacks exist solely for 
compensatory purposes. For example, Joseph Harrington noted that the 
                                                 
53. Kaplow, supra note 44, at 394. 
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Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 48, at 835. 
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“organic peroxides cartel was explicit that the buy-back was done for 
purposes of compensation as it was to reflect the firms’ foregone profit.”59  
Second, inter-competitor sales disgorge the excess gains of firms that sell 
more than their cartel allotment. Compulsory buybacks are less punitive 
than other forms of cartel discipline; after all, the overseller is merely 
redistributing its unwarranted gains to its co-conspirator pursuant to the 
terms of an agreement that they both negotiated beforehand.60 In contrast, 
some forms of cartel enforcement resemble true penalties that can render 
cheating on the cartel not cost-beneficial. For example, some cartel leaders 
will punish cheaters with price wars that cause an overselling firm to lose 
much more than it gained from overselling in the first place.61 While 
buybacks are less retributive than price wars, the threat of more serious 
punishments can help a buyback scheme function. For example, some cartel 
oversellers may acquiesce to purchasing unneeded products from a cartel 
partner in order to avoid being subjected to a more brutal punishment, such 
as a full-on price war.62 
Third, although buybacks are required regardless of whether a cartel 
member’s overselling was intentional or inadvertent, the presence of a 
buyback protocol reduces the expected financial gains from cheating on the 
cartel agreement by selling more than one’s quota.63 So long as the cartel’s 
monitoring mechanism is reasonably accurate, cheating is not a profit-
maximizing strategy because the cartel managers will use buybacks to 
balance the cartel books at regular intervals.64 By minimizing all 
conspirators’ incentives to cheat, a system of inter-competitor sales 
stabilizes the cartel in the long run. 
b. Inter-Competitor Sales Facilitate Trust 
The absence of trust is a fundamental problem for many cartels. In order 
to be stable in the long run, cartel members need to trust each other not to 
cheat and to compensate each other when actual sales deviate from cartel 
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61. Leslie, supra note 35, at 615–21. 
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allotments. In the absence of trust, the cartel will have a hard time forming 
in the first place and, if formed, will be more likely to collapse into 
competition. Cartel managers invest significant time and resources to make 
themselves appear trustworthy65 and to encourage the cartel partners to trust 
each other. The development of effective enforcement regimes can help 
cartel partners overcome the problem of mutual distrust. Inter-competitor 
sales can facilitate trust. For example, when two members of the citric acid 
cartel—Haarmann & Reimer and ADM—were in a dispute because the 
former had oversold its cartel allotment while the latter had undersold, a 
high-level executive from Hoffmann-La Roche (a major player in the cartel) 
intervened to counsel H&R that it must purchase products from ADM 
because mandatory inter-competitor sales were “an essential part of the 
agreement and . . . non-compliance on this point would undermine the trust 
necessary to maintain the cartel and would therefore be harmful to all 
participants.”66  
While some price-fixing cartels have treated inter-competitor sales as 
mandatory,67 other cartels have treated such book-balancing sales as 
optional. For example, “[i]n the organic peroxides cartel, buy-backs were 
not presented as something compulsory but rather that it was an option to a 
firm to request it when it sold below quota.”68 But even when inter-
competitor sales were not compulsory, they have represented an important 
goodwill gesture among cartel members. Such voluntary inter-competitor 
sales to restore cartel balances may be important as trust-generating devices. 
As Judge Posner explained, a price fixer’s decision to purchase from a co-
conspirator instead of expanding its own production “preserves peace 
among the cartelists.”69 Even when a cartel member has available supply, it 
may purchase product from a cartel partner who has undersold its quota. 
Such goodwill gestures are common among cartelists who want to engender 
trust among the co-conspirators.70 
Cooperating even when one does not have to can create goodwill that 
will lead to greater mutual cooperation in the long run.71 Empirical evidence 
shows that in order to generate goodwill among cartel partners, cartel 
members forego sales, create business relationships, and stay out of entire 
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trustworthiness and cartel stability). 
66. HARRINGTON, supra note 59, at 59. 
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product lines.72 This calculated benevolence can create trust among natural 
rivals and thereby stabilize a cartel agreement.73 Similarly, inter-firm sales 
may act as a type of goodwill gesture that facilitates trust and, thus, 
strengthens the cartel. By funneling money to a rival through product 
purchases, a cartel member signals to its co-conspirator that it is committed 
to the long-term success of their illegal venture. 
Inter-competitor sales—especially at below-market prices—can help 
rivals establish trust even before the formalization of an anti-competitive 
agreement. For example, when Dow Chemical Company wanted to cartelize 
the market for magnesium in the 1920s, it knew that it would have to keep 
Alcoa, its rival in other metals markets, out of the market for magnesium.74 
Already the largest manufacturer of aluminum in the United States, Alcoa 
would likely enter the magnesium market if the magnesium cartel raised the 
price of magnesium. In order to induce Alcoa not to enter the magnesium 
market, Dow Chemical approached Alcoa and offered to sell it magnesium 
at fifty-five cents a pound, which was twenty cents less than the then-
prevailing market price.75 Although initially skeptical of Dow’s intentions, 
Alcoa eventually agreed and purchased its magnesium requirements from 
Dow at below-market prices in exchange for staying out of the magnesium 
market, thus allowing Dow to lead a more disciplined cartel. Although Dow 
and Alcoa were not actual competitors in magnesium at the time of the sales, 
they were potential competitors and Dow’s below-cost sales to its rival in 
the wings helped the two metal giants enter a separate series of anti-
competitive contracts.76 
c. Inter-Competitor Sales Create Artificial Scarcity 
In some industries, inter-competitor sales may help stabilize price by 
removing product from the market. A dominant firm in a cartel may 
purchase products from a cartel partner with excess inventory in order to 
remove the latter’s temptation to sell more than its cartel quota. During the 
Great Depression, for example, the international aluminum cartel purchased 
the unsold output of its members, operating essentially as a merchant firm 
that regulated the flow of aluminum into the market.77 Then, as now, such 
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inter-competitor sales perform the function of manipulating market output 
in order to raise price. 
Cartel members will also sometimes make purchases from non-cartel 
members in order to deplete available supply and, thus, put upward pressure 
on the market price. For example, members of the B2 vitamin cartel grew 
concerned when the American brewer Coors built a production facility with 
sufficient capacity to affect the world market price for the vitamin. To 
prevent Coors from exporting B2, Swiss-based Roche purchased half of 
Coors’s output.78 This sale was suspicious given Roche’s lack of need, as 
demonstrated by Roche’s sale of some of Coors’s B2 to its cartel partner 
BASF, which allowed the firms to share the cost of creating artificial 
scarcity. This episode illustrates two separate ways that inter-rival sales can 
facilitate—and demonstrate—an underlying price-fixing conspiracy. First, 
some inter-company sales are designed to create artificial scarcity, which 
allows a cartel to increase the prevailing price. Second, inter-competitor 
sales can preserve the relative market shares as agreed to by the 
conspirators. Thus, the sales from Roche to BASF ensured that each sold its 
cartel-allocated amount of B2.79 In short, a cartel member may purchase 
product from non-cartel members so that they cannot disrupt the cartel’s 
manipulation of market output and, thus, market price.80 
Antitrust law condemns agreements that create artificial scarcity because 
this manufactured paucity increases prices and thus constitutes per se illegal 
price fixing.81 Most notably, the Supreme Court in United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co.82 condemned an agreement among oil companies to 
purchase oil on the spot market in order to drive up the market price as per 
se illegal price fixing even though the defendants did not fix a specific price. 
Whether or not the inter-competitor sales are taking place between cartel 
partners or between one conspirator and an innocent rival, these sales can 
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raise price by reducing the amount of product available to consumers. Under 
either scenario, the inter-competitor sales can facilitate an underlying price-
fixing conspiracy. 
B. The Actual Use of Inter-Competitor Sales by Cartels 
The advantages of inter-competitor sales are not merely theoretical. The 
history of cartelization cannot be told without reference to inter-competitor 
sales. Empirically, price-fixing cartels have employed this method of cartel 
accounting for almost a century. During the pre-World War II era, cartels 
dominated many international markets. These early cartels often used inter-
competitor sales as a mechanism to balance their cartel books and to create 
uniform prices within an industry. 
Beginning in the late 1800s and continuing through most of the twentieth 
century, international trade in aluminum was controlled by an aluminum 
cartel operated out of Europe. Because European nations generally 
encouraged international cartels, the aluminum cartel operated relatively 
openly.83 One iteration of the aluminum cartel in the early twentieth century 
used the cartel’s central organization as a clearinghouse of sorts to purchase 
product from cartel members who sold less than their cartel allotment.84 The 
managers of the aluminum cartel assigned market quotas for each 
participant, and “if a member exceeded its quota, it was compelled to buy 
metal from the others.”85 Every three months, the aluminum cartel managers 
would balance the books by compelling oversellers to purchase product 
from an underselling cartel member.86 
Another example involves the dyestuffs cartel, which effectively 
implemented an arrangement in which no dye-maker manufactured every 
product line and instead “even major manufacturers depend[ed] on their 
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competitors for certain [products].”87 Division of product lines is a common 
characteristic of cartel arrangements in broad industries with a range of 
products.88 In the case of the dyestuffs cartel, for example, in 1939 DuPont 
and General Aniline purchased over $2 million worth of product from each 
other.89 Across the dyestuff industry, companies sold products to each other 
at discounted prices.90 Stocking and Watkins explained that the dyestuffs 
cartelists sometimes used their inter-competitor sales contracts to 
“stipulate[] uniform sales prices for dyes produced under the contract. By 
such practices the dominant producers [] virtually eliminated price 
competition in dyestuffs markets.”91 The system of inter-competitor sales, 
while not employed as a traditional buyback scheme as with the aluminum 
cartel, provided a critical component of the dyestuffs cartel.92 
The use of inter-competitor sales by cartels is not just a historical 
curiosity. Many of the largest exposed price-fixing conspiracies of recent 
years have used inter-competitor sales as an important mechanism for cartel 
accounting and management. For example, during the 1990s, major 
international corporations conspired to fix prices in the market for citric 
acid, a preservative added to many foods.93 The cartel overcharged 
American buyers by over $100 million; some estimates put the total 
overcharges paid by American consumers at above $309 million.94 
Although the cartel overcharges were directly paid by food processors, 
consumers were the cartel’s ultimate victims.  
The members of the citric acid cartel negotiated sales quotas and created 
a reporting system whereby each firm submitted monthly sales data to a 
designated cartel member who would compile reports that showed which 
firms were selling more than their cartel quota and which firms less.95 Any 
divergences between allotted sales and actual sales were corrected through 
a buyback system where oversellers purchased product from undersellers.96 
The European Commission explained that the citric acid cartel’s managers 
constructed a buyback program “to penalise those companies selling above 
their assigned sales quota and at the same time compensate those that did 
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not reach it.”97 For example, members of the citric acid cartel utilized this 
buyback mechanism when German-based Haarmann & Reimer sold more 
than its cartel allotment while Illinois-headquartered Archer Daniels 
Midland (ADM) undersold.98 Although Haarmann & Reimer was 
displeased with having to compensate ADM by purchasing citric acid from 
it, the parties reached a buyback agreement in order to preserve the cartel 
arrangement.99 Cartel economist John Connor noted that “[t]his 
arrangement was kept almost perfectly” by the cartel’s members until the 
conspiracy was exposed.100  
Similar to the citric acid cartel, in the 1990s, several of the world’s major 
agribusinesses conspired to collectively control the international market for 
lysine, an amino acid added to animal feed.101 In less than four years of 
operation, the lysine cartel illegally overcharged its customers between 
$200 and $250 million,102 $80 million of which was paid by U.S. 
customers.103 Consumers ultimately paid these overcharges in the form of 
higher prices for chicken, pork, and other animal products.104 
The lysine cartel was able to maintain its price-fixing scheme, in part, 
through the use of inter-competitor sales. ADM, which served as the 
primary manager of the cartel, appointed Terry Wilson as ADM’s point 
person. Wilson had no background in lysine but had a solid resume in price 
fixing; he had managed ADM’s participation in the international citric acid 
cartel.105 Wilson organized a system whereby each cartel firm would report 
its lysine sales figures, which would then be distributed among the cartel 
membership.106 These numbers were then used to determine whether any 
inter-competitor sales were necessary to balance the cartel’s books. 
Applying his experience from the citric acid cartel, Wilson convinced the 
other lysine manufacturers that “[s]ticking to the allocated shares would 
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work because of a system of guaranteed ‘buy-ins.’ If a lysine maker became 
aggressive and sold more than its share, then it would have to buy product 
from producers who sold less. In this way, the rigged fractions would be 
preserved.”107 This buyback structure helped ensure that the members of the 
lysine conspiracy did not exceed their cartel quotas.108 James Griffin, a 
former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, who is an expert in the operation 
of price-fixing conspiracies, described the lysine cartel’s use of buybacks as 
“typical.”109  
The largest exposed cartel of the modern era has been the multi-billion 
dollar vitamins cartel, which was actually composed of several separate, but 
related, cartels in individual vitamins that were added to animal feed, human 
food, or supplements.110 The cartel caused inflated prices in hundreds of 
consumer markets, including meat, poultry, fish, eggs, milk, and even 
cosmetics.111 Ultimately, the overcharges from the vitamins cartels 
exceeded $15 billion.112 
Many of the individual vitamins cartels employed buyback protocols. 
For example, the cartel managers had to utilize its buyback program in 1996 
and 1997 when Roche and BASF sold more than their allotted quotas of 
vitamins A and E and had to purchase products from their cartel partners 
who undersold during those years.113 Members of the vitamins A and E 
cartels provided monthly sales reports to cartel managers, who would 
monitor whether cartel firms were over- or underselling.114 In finding these 
vitamins manufacturers liable for violating European competition law, the 
European Commission noted: “Any company that sold more than its allotted 
share was required in the following year to purchase the excess from another 
conspirator that had not reached its volume allocation target.”115 It is not 
clear whether every arm of the vitamin cartel employed buybacks, but “most 
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of the vitamins cartels had compensation policies. Whenever a company 
exceeded its quota, that firm was obligated to sell the excess production at 
cost to an under-achiever in the cartel. Resale of the transferred product 
would restore the planned division of monopoly profits.”116 These buyback 
provisions helped to stabilize the multi-billion-dollar vitamins cartels until 
they were eventually exposed and successfully prosecuted. 
All of these examples prove the simple point that price-fixing 
conspiracies often plan to—and do—engage in inter-competitor sales as a 
mechanism to stabilize their cartel arrangements. These cases are not 
atypical.117 Cartel scholars Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Suslow have 
explained that while cartels may experiment with different mechanisms to 
balance the cartel’s books, “[t]he most common compensation procedure 
requires cartel members who have sold more than their share to purchase 
output from those who have undersold.”118 In short, inter-competitor sales 
are commonly associated with price-fixing activity. 
IV. JUDICIAL MISHANDLING OF INTER-COMPETITOR SALES 
Until 2017, antitrust precedent was consistent in recognizing inter-
competitor sales as a plus factor for proving price-fixing conspiracies. In 
creating a circuit split on the evidentiary significance of inter-competitor 
sales, the Third Circuit’s Valspar opinion committed a number of mistakes, 
some minor and some significant. This Part identifies these errors and 
explains why these mistakes are important. It concludes by arguing that 
Valspar is not viable precedent moving forward. 
A. The Scholarly and Precedential Record 
The Valspar majority began its discussion on the probative value of 
inter-competitor sales by belittling the persuasive authority of the Michigan 
article, asserting that the “law review article [] spends only one paragraph 
on this theory.”119 This characterization is deceptive.120 The use of buybacks 
by cartels is not a mere “theory”; it is a fact that for the past century, cartels 
have employed buybacks to compensate cartel members who have sold less 
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than their cartel quotas.121 The practice is well documented in both historical 
cartels and modern ones.122 The fact that it is a single law review article 
should be irrelevant if the article’s analysis and conclusion are correct. The 
Third Circuit provides no reason to believe that the four authors of the 
Michigan article are wrong.123 
The Third Circuit seemed to try to create the illusion that the Michigan 
article was anomalous or uncorroborated. The Valspar majority, for 
example, chastised the Michigan article because it “cites no precedent or 
economic studies to support” the proposition that inter-competitor sales are 
a plus factor.124 In some ways, this is a self-defeating critique given that the 
Michigan article is itself an economic study of collusion in which economic 
experts explain the probative value of many factors, including notably inter-
competitor sales, as circumstantial evidence to show the existence of an 
underlying price-fixing conspiracy. 
To the extent that the majority was attempting to imply that neither 
precedent nor studies exist, that insinuation is incorrect. With respect to its 
sources, the Michigan authors explained that they “derive[d] these 
possibilities from [their] review of the published records of the vitamins 
cartel and other producer conspiracies prosecuted in Europe and in the 
United States,” and they cited their previous scholarship on the vitamins 
cartel.125 Moreover, the Third Circuit’s emphasis on a lack of scholarship 
supporting the plaintiff’s position that buybacks are indicative of cartel 
activity is odd because a significant amount of legal, economic, and 
historical scholarship had also noted that cartels often use inter-competitor 
sales as an accounting mechanism.126 Indeed, every major scholar of cartel 
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conduct has confirmed that many price-fixing conspiracies employ inter-
competitor sales as a cartel-stabilizing device.127  
With respect to the Third Circuit’s insinuation that no precedent supports 
the argument that inter-competitor sales constitute a plus factor, that, too, is 
wrong. Several courts have held that inter-competitor sales have probative 
value and should be considered a plus factor.128 Most significantly, as noted 
previously, the Seventh Circuit in In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust 
Litigation129 held that inter-competitor sales are an important plus factor.130 
The private litigation against the members of the high fructose corn syrup 
(HFCS) cartel stands in contrast to the private antitrust lawsuits brought 
against the lysine, citric acid, and vitamins cartels. The private plaintiffs 
suing the latter cartels did not have to rely on inter-competitor sales as 
evidence to prove the conspiracy because the defendants had already pled 
guilty to price-fixing, and private plaintiffs could use the successful 
government cases as definitive proof of an illegal agreement.131 Thus, even 
though those cartels used inter-competitor sales, the plaintiffs never had to 
present any plus factors.132 
Although the HFCS cartel included some members of these other price-
fixing conspiracies, the private antitrust lawsuits against the defendants in 
the HFCS market were more fraught. Because the government declined to 
prosecute the HFCS cartel, the cartel’s victims were left on their own to 
prove a price-fixing agreement. In the absence of a successful government 
prosecution or direct evidence, plaintiffs sought to prove an agreement 
among the HFCS manufacturers through circumstantial evidence.  
The district court initially did not appreciate the probative value of the 
inter-competitor sales among the HFCS defendants and granted them 
summary judgment.133 The Seventh Circuit reversed, explaining in detail 
why inter-competitor sales are an important plus factor. In particular, Judge 
Posner observed that “[a] seller who experiences a surge in demand, but 
meets the surge by buying what it needs from another seller rather than by 
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expanding its own production, protects the other firm’s market share and so 
preserves peace among the cartelists.”134 On remand, the district court better 
appreciated the empirical use of inter-competitor sales by price fixers when 
it noted that “[l]ike the conspiracies identified by the Department of Justice 
in the lysine and citric acid markets, the corn syrup conspiracy was allegedly 
accomplished by [] executives . . . negotiating inter-company purchases 
among themselves when required to balance volume discrepancies . . . .”135 
In particular, the district judge noted the plaintiffs’ evidence showing 
greater inter-competitor sales among price-fixing conspirators during 
periods of illegal cartelization.136 After the district court subsequently 
recognized the inter-competitor sales as an important plus factor to proving 
the existence of a conspiracy and denied the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment, the HFCS defendants settled, paying hundreds of 
millions of dollars to the cartel’s customers.137 
The Valspar court should have been aware of the Seventh Circuit 
opinion. In parallel antitrust litigation challenging the same alleged titanium 
dioxide price-fixing conspiracy that the Valspar plaintiff was challenging, 
the federal district court in Maryland quoted Posner’s opinion talking about 
the suspicious nature of inter-competitor sales. The Maryland court cited 
Judge Posner’s opinion for the proposition that “a seller that buys product 
from a competitor when it has excess capacity acts against its competitive 
self-interest.”138 The Valspar Third Circuit panel was aware of this parallel 
litigation, including the Maryland court’s decision, as it noted that the 
Maryland court reached a different conclusion than the Valspar court on 
“substantially the same record.”139 Given the ubiquity of Judge Posner’s 
opinion explaining the significance of inter-competitor sales,140 it seems odd 
for the Third Circuit to imply that no precedent exists.  
In sum, the Third Circuit was wrong to suggest that there was no 
precedent for holding that inter-competitor sales are relevant and probative 
evidence that can form part of the circumstantial case for inferring a price-
fixing agreement. 
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Furthermore, even if there were no published precedent, a court would 
not be precluded from properly finding that inter-competitor sales constitute 
a plus factor. Antitrust law is common law.141 All of the currently 
recognized plus factors were generated one court decision at a time as 
judges came to understand how price-fixing conspiracies operate. 
B. Valspar’s Mistakes 
In addition to failing to appreciate the scholarly and precedential lay of 
the land, the Third Circuit committed a series of factual and legal errors en 
route to its split decision to affirm summary judgment for the price-fixing 
defendants. This section details four mistakes that the Valspar court made 
in its treatment of inter-competitor sales. 
1. The Size of Sales 
The Valspar court minimized the significance of the inter-competitor 
sales by suggesting that the sales volume among the titanium dioxide 
manufacturers was not high enough to indicate cartel activity. The Third 
Circuit attached great importance to the quantity of inter-competitor sales, 
opining that “Valspar’s expert conceded that the sales were at such low 
volumes that they would not have resulted in large shifts of market share, 
thus largely defeating Valspar's theory of profit redistribution.”142 The court 
implied that if inter-competitor sales do not cause “large shifts of market 
share,” then they have no probative value.143 The court’s reasoning, 
however, is flawed and raises more questions than it answers. 
First, the court refused to state the dollar volume of the inter-competitor 
sales that occurred among the titanium dioxide manufacturers. The court 
redacted that information from the public record, including the plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s briefs. Thus, we don’t know what numbers the court 
characterized as too low to indicate collusion, or what precisely constitutes 
a “large shift[] of market share.”144 The court gave no indication of how 
much money would need to change hands in order for an inter-competitor 
transaction to be part of a cartel arrangement instead of a non-cartel-related 
sale.145 The court provided absolutely no basis for asserting that the volume 
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of sales among the defendants was too low to be part of a cartel’s accounting 
procedures. 
These omissions gut the case’s precedential value on this point because 
future litigants cannot properly analogize or distinguish the facts of their 
case to the facts of Valspar. The redactions are also puzzling: If inter-
company sales are perfectly benign conduct that we expect to see in 
competitive markets, why is the court concealing this information? More 
importantly, the court’s suppression of the numbers makes it harder to 
evaluate the court’s reasoning.  
Second, if the sales were so insignificant, then why did they take place 
at all? The sales were sufficiently important to the companies for the sales 
to occur. If the seller sold the titanium dioxide to make a profit on the sales, 
then it is an amount of money large enough for the seller to care about. The 
court’s apparent notion that inter-competitor sales are not evidence of cartel 
bookkeeping unless they result in a “large shift [] of market share” displays 
a fundamental unawareness of how business executives—including price 
fixers—operate.146 The vast majority of legitimate business contracts are for 
sales that amount to a value less than a fraction of a single percentage point 
of market share, and yet businesses routinely sue to enforce these 
agreements when they are breached. Similarly, when a firm’s cartel partner 
violates the cartel agreement by selling more than its quota, the underselling 
firm will pursue the remedy provided by the cartel, which is often a 
compelled inter-competitor sale.147  
Third, relatively low-volume imbalances in cartel shares still get 
corrected. When cartel members demand remedies for perceived cheating 
by their cartel partner, the level of cheating and the amount of the remedy 
are generally quite low when measured in terms of the overall market.148 
Cartels negotiate, haggle, and bicker at the margins, over much less than a 
single percentage point share of the market. For example, when the vitamin 
A and E cartels were in operation, top-level executives negotiated “small 
adjustments to company quotas”149 and regional cartel managers met 
quarterly “to make small changes in prices in local currencies.”150  
In the face of perceived violations of the cartel agreement, many a 
slighted cartel member would not hesitate to invoke the inter-competitor 
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sales remedy. The managers of the citric acid cartel allocated “market shares 
to within 1/10 of 1%.”151 In short, cartels routinely deal in minutia.  
Fourth, relatively small intercompany sales can completely balance the 
cartel’s books for a given reporting period. Inter-competitor sales do not 
need to lead to “large shifts of market share.”152 That is not their function. 
Inter-competitor sales are an accounting measure to balance the books, not 
to fundamentally redistribute market share. It is important to note that past 
price-fixing conspiracies that indisputably used inter-competitor sales to 
balance their cartel books did not use them to affect large shifts in market 
share, but rather to fine tune the distribution of cartel profits. For example, 
in the citric acid cartel, such compensatory sales were less than a single 
percentage point of the market.153 The price fixer who sells more than its 
cartel allotment purchases products from its cartel partner not to shift large 
market shares, but to honor its cartel commitments.154 The inter-competitor 
sales are not supposed to effect wide swings in market share. The sales are 
simply a way to balance the books at scheduled intervals. Thus, the fact that 
the dollar value of the inter-competitor sales did not constitute a large 
market share in no way indicates that such sales are not being used as a 
cartel book-balancing device. 
Finally, in most price-fixing conspiracies, inter-competitor sales were 
employed only after other efforts to manipulate sales failed to achieve the 
cartel’s sales quotas for each individual cartel member. Cartel managers are 
tasked with preventing significant imbalances in sales.155 Cartels, such as 
those in organic peroxides, amino acids, and vitamins, often assigned a 
cartel member to track members’ sales and adjust output, which would 
reduce the size of any side payments or buybacks at the end of the reporting 
period.156 Joe Harrington has observed that “cartels actively sought to avoid 
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the necessity of buy-backs.”157 Indeed, because “regular and large inter-firm 
purchases may have created suspicions about collusion, . . . it would make 
sense for cartel members to strenuously avoid the necessity of having to 
engage in inter-firm sales.”158 Given that inter-competitor sales are done 
after other adjustments,159 it is hardly surprising that the transactions’ values 
may appear low.  
In short, inter-competitor sales can be probative of price fixing even if 
the amount of those purchases does not rise to the level of producing “large 
shifts of market share.”160 Inter-competitor sales are often intended to effect 
minor adjustments, not major redistributions of market share. For the Third 
Circuit to suggest that low-volume inter-competitor sales necessarily have 
little or no probative value reveals a lack of understanding regarding how 
price-fixing cartels operate. 
2. The Significance of Cross-Licensing Agreements 
The district court and the Third Circuit majority in Valspar afforded 
much weight to the possibility that the inter-competitor sales among 
titanium dioxide manufacturers may have taken place pursuant to a cross-
licensing agreement. For example, the district court emphasized that “it is 
undisputed that the sales from DuPont to Kronos were largely attributable 
to a cross-licensing agreement reached to avoid litigation.”161 Similarly, the 
Third Circuit noted that “a number of these sales were made by DuPont to 
Kronos pursuant to a cross-licensing agreement in order to avoid patent 
litigation.”162 The judges seemed to think that because cross-licensing 
agreements are legal, the presence of inter-competitor sales is necessarily 
innocuous if they take place in the context of such licenses. 
This line of thinking is wrong for several reasons. First, although the 
Valspar opinions tried to paint inter-competitor sales as an ordinary part of 
a cross-licensing agreement, they are not. Cross-licensing agreements are 
simply enforceable promises among patent owners not to sue each other for 
infringing their intellectual property rights. Licensing agreements generally 
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do not involve the sale of physical products. When a cross-licensing 
agreement does include the sale of physical goods, the goods are normally 
not the final manufactured product.163 The fact that the cross-licensing 
agreements among the titanium dioxide manufacturers entailed regular sales 
among rivals does not render the inter-competitor sales above-board; rather, 
it warrants some antitrust skepticism about the licensing agreements 
themselves. 
Second, the presence of cross-licensing agreements does not remove any 
appropriate misapprehension about rivals purchasing products from each 
other. Price-fixing conspiracies often use IP licensing relationships as a 
subterfuge to hold cartel meetings and to facilitate cartel payments.164 
Moreover, the cross-licensing of patents is sometimes part and parcel with 
inter-competitor sales of an overall scheme to fix prices.165 For example, the 
dyestuffs cartel used patent licenses to “provide not only for intercompany 
sales at special prices, but . . . [also to] stipulate[] uniform sales prices for 
dyes produced under the contract.”166 Through these “practices[,] the 
dominant producers have virtually eliminated price competition in dyestuffs 
markets.”167 Even if the licensing agreements are the product of a settlement 
to infringement litigation, settlements are an easy decoy for monetary side 
payments that would be too suspicious if unaccompanied by the cover story 
that the rivals are settling a legal dispute.168 Disguising a cartel payment as 
a settlement of infringement litigation provides a mechanism for cartel 
partners to balance the cartel’s books while seeming legitimate and allowing 
the firms to justify why the transaction is secret.169 
The Valspar court took the plaintiff’s concession that a legitimate cross-
licensing agreement could theoretically include the sale of a physical 
product and transformed this bland acknowledgement into a judicial holding 
that the presence of a cross-licensing agreement must, as a matter of law, 
deprive inter-competitor sales of any probative value. This is wrong. 
Whether inter-competitor sales are indicative of an underlying price-fixing 
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58, at 43–44 (explaining how cartels can use settlements as side payments). 
169. MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 58, at 129. 










conspiracy depends on the facts of an individual case. The mere presence of 
a licensing agreement does not cleanse suspicious behavior of its probative 
value. Furthermore, the court never discussed the actual cross-licensing 
agreements between the titanium dioxide manufacturers to determine 
whether the inter-competitor sales at issue truly took place pursuant to the 
terms of those agreements.  
Applying these insights to the facts of Valspar demonstrates how the 
Third Circuit erred. It is possible that the titanium dioxide manufacturers 
created their cross-license relationships in order to conceal their price-fixing 
arrangement. Patent cross-licensing agreements can be employed as part of 
a cartel arrangement in order to funnel money from one conspirator to 
another in a way that appears innocent.170 The Third Circuit may have fallen 
into this precise trap by assuming that the mere presence of a cross-licensing 
agreement necessarily sapped all inter-competitor sales of any probative 
value. 
Moreover, the Third Circuit seemed to misrepresent the Michigan 
article’s teachings on the significance of patent licensing. The Third Circuit 
noted that the Michigan article “recognizes that patent licensing and cross 
licensing can be legitimate.”171 The Third Circuit improperly conflated 
possibility with actuality. The fact that licensing can be legitimate does not 
mean that it necessarily is. It is up to the factfinder to determine whether or 
not the licensing in the case at hand represents a legitimate arms-length 
transaction or the enforcement apparatus of a price-fixing conspiracy. The 
Michigan article explicitly notes that patent cross-licensing agreements may 
be used as “a means for dividing the collusive gain,” and the existence of 
such agreements may be evidence of an underlying collusive agreement.172 
The four authors argued that some “transactions require scrutiny, such as 
patent licensing, cross-licensing, and patent pools, as well as the settlement 
of seemingly frivolous lawsuits.”173 The authors argued that patent cross-
licensing does not prove the innocence of inter-competitor sales, but rather 
requires enhanced antitrust scrutiny.  
In sum, the Valspar court was wrong to suggest that inter-competitor 
sales raise no antitrust suspicion so long as the sales occurred pursuant to a 
patent licensing agreement or cross-licensing agreement. Courts should not 
misinterpret the presence of a cross-licensing agreement as somehow 
depriving inter-competitor sales of their probative value in developing a 
circumstantial case from which a price-fixing conspiracy can be inferred. 
To do so would essentially allow a price-fixing cartel to employ a traditional 
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cartel enforcement mechanism—inter-competitor sales—while depriving it 
of its probative value simply by also entering into a sham cross-licensing 
agreement. Courts should not grant price fixers the ability to eliminate the 
evidentiary value of their cartel enforcement mechanisms. The presence of 
a cross-licensing agreement does not render inter-competitor sales non-
probative of price fixing. 
3. Non-Market Prices 
The Valspar court also failed to attach any significance to the fact that 
many of the inter-competitor sales between titanium dioxide manufacturers 
were at non-market prices. The district court acknowledged that 
“[t]hroughout the Conspiracy Period, DuPont and the other defendants 
made intercompany sales at below-market prices. It is undisputed that these 
sales existed . . . .”174 The court nonetheless asserted that these sales at 
below-market prices did “not advance Valspar's ball very far.”175 The Third 
Circuit ignored the significance of these non-market prices and endorsed the 
district court’s finding that the inter-competitor sales at below-market prices 
were “just as consistent with non-collusive activity as with conspiracy.”176 
Like the district court, the Third Circuit majority focused on the argument 
that DuPont needed to purchase titanium dioxide because Hurricane Katrina 
had disabled one of its plants.177 At most, the court explains why DuPont 
needed to buy titanium dioxide, but not why its rivals needed to sell to it, let 
alone why DuPont’s competitors would sell it at prices “sometimes lower 
than the average prices for non-defendants.”178 Beyond these sales, for 
which the defendants proffered an explanation, there were other inter-
competitor sales at non-market prices. For example, the Valspar dissent 
noted that “when DuPont would sell Kronos TiO2, Kronos paid an average 
of 16% less for the TiO2 than DuPont’s own customers did. DuPont also 
sold TiO2 to Millennium at below-market prices. One of Valspar’s experts, 
Dr. Williams, was able to identify years of below-market sales between the 
TiO2 manufacturers.”179 No simple explanation was given for these non-
market transactions. As explained below, inter-competitor sales at non-
market prices are particularly suspicious and probative of price fixing.180 
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4. Confusing Proffers and Proof 
The Valspar majority suggested that the Michigan article was not 
applicable to the case before the court because the article “seems to limit its 
analysis to ‘interfirm transfers of resources that are largely void of 
productive unilateral motivations.’”181 Taking the Michigan article’s 
reasonable caveat as its guide, the Valspar majority set out to find a 
“productive unilateral motivation” for the defendants’ inter-competitor 
sales. The judges hypothesized about non-collusive reasons why DuPont 
may have purchased titanium dioxide from its rival, including that DuPont 
needed titanium dioxide because Hurricane Katrina had damaged one of its 
manufacturing facilities.182 The defendant never proved that DuPont 
actually had shortages that compelled it to purchase the titanium dioxide 
from its rivals. The court did not cite evidence in the record that DuPont 
bought titanium dioxide from its rivals for legitimate reasons unrelated to 
price fixing. Instead, the court relied primarily on the plaintiff’s expert’s 
reasonable concession that this was hypothetically possible.183 The district 
court, for example, took the defendants’ asserted justifications for its inter-
competitor sales as irrefutable proof that these were the actual motivations 
and that the defendants did not conspire as a matter of law.184 The Third 
Circuit characterized the defendant’s explanation of its inter-competitor 
sales as “reasonable.”185 But the issue is not whether DuPont’s explanations 
are reasonable; the issue is whether or not the explanations are true. The 
defendant’s mere proffer of an explanation for why it bought products from 
a rival does not deplete the inter-competitor sales of their probative value. 
As a procedural matter, the court was too quick to take this issue away 
from the jury. In its prior price-fixing cases, the Third Circuit has repeatedly 
held that “defendants are [not] entitled to summary judgment merely by 
showing that there is a plausible explanation for their conduct.”186 It is up to 
a jury to determine whether the defendants’ inter-competitor sales were part 
and parcel of a price-fixing conspiracy or the consequence of independent 
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decision-making. Even if DuPont’s need to buy product because its factory 
has been temporarily placed off-line was a legitimate explanation for inter-
firm purchases, it is the jury’s job to decide whether this is what actually 
motivated DuPont to purchase titanium dioxide from its rival. The Valspar 
court overstepped its bounds by holding that a defendant’s proffered reason 
is true as a matter of law.187 
After the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case that the defendants 
have engaged in price fixing, the defendants are afforded the opportunity to 
rebut the plaintiff’s case. In particular, the defendants may argue that the 
plaintiff’s plus factors are not indicative of collusion because the defendants 
have benign explanations for their seemingly suspicious conduct, such as 
inter-competitor sales. The mere possibility that the inter-competitor sales 
between the defendants may have been prompted by reasons unrelated to an 
underlying price-fixing conspiracy does not mean that evidence of such 
sales has no probative value. The plaintiff must have the opportunity to 
explain to the jury why the defendants’ proffered explanation for its 
suspicious conduct is untrue. The plaintiff should have the ability to cross-
examine the defendants’ employees who claim that they engaged in inter-
competitor sales because of the firms’ actual, legitimate short-term needs, 
and not in order to balance the books of a cartel. This is often a question of 
witness credibility. That is a jury function. 
The inter-competitor sales remain admissible evidence, for which the 
parties in litigation can present competing theories of significance to the 
jury. The plaintiff can argue that the inter-competitor sales were used as a 
cartel enforcement mechanism. In response, the defendants can argue that 
they had a benign reason for these sales unrelated to price collusion. Federal 
judges who have never heard the witnesses are not supposed to substitute 
their perceptions for those of the jury. At the pre-trial stage, inter-competitor 
sales are probative of price-fixing. 
In sum, the defendants must be given the opportunity to prove that their 
suspicious behavior was the product of independent decision-making, not 
collusion. But a proffer is not proof. The Third Circuit conflated the two and 
let the defendant’s proffered explanation outweigh the expert opinion of 
leading scholars and the plaintiff’s economist’s testimony.188 In holding that 
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the defendants’ proffered explanations outweighed the plaintiff’s evidence, 
including the plaintiff’s expert witness testimony and the persuasive 
authority of four noted experts in the field, the Third Circuit invaded the 
province of the jury. 
C. Valspar as Precedent? 
The Third Circuit opinion creates the risk that subsequent courts will cite 
it for the proposition that there are no precedents and no economic studies 
showing that inter-competitor sales are probative of price fixing. That would 
be wrong. Precedent exists;189 studies exist.190 No future court should cite 
Valspar for the proposition that neither precedent nor studies exist to prove 
that price-fixing conspiracies use inter-competitor sales to enforce their 
illegal cartel agreements. Neither should future courts rely on Valspar’s 
assertions that inter-competitor sales are not indicative of price fixing if the 
sales volume is low, if the defendants are parties to cross-licensing 
agreements, or if the defendants proffer a non-collusive explanation for their 
inter-firm transactions. Although such evidence may be admissible, it is not 
dispositive. 
Independent of these mistakes, the Valspar opinion is best read as limited 
to its facts. The Third Circuit noted that the district court opinion was based 
on “looking to the specific facts present here.”191 The precedential value of 
Valspar is compromised by the court issuing a fact-specific opinion while 
withholding important facts by redacting the details of the inter-competitor 
sales that the court found non-probative. 
In sum, courts should not rely on Valspar for the proposition that inter-
competitor sales are not a plus factor. The real danger of Valspar is that it 
could help price-fixing conspiracies solve the enforcement problem. The 
absence of a credible method of balancing the cartel’s books can doom a 
cartel before it ever starts. If courts provide cartels with some measure of 
assurance that their method of balancing the cartel’s books will not be used 
as a plus factor, this could embolden more industries to consider price fixing 
as a profit-maximizing strategy. Conversely, when antitrust law discourages 
cartel enforcement mechanisms, it can better deter price fixing from 
occurring. For example, the suspiciousness of providing direct side 
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payments makes cartelization more difficult and, thus, less likely.192 
Similarly, by assigning inter-competitor sales their appropriate probative 
value, courts can deter their use and make price-fixing conspiracies less 
stable. That is precisely how antitrust law is supposed to function.193 
V. THE PROPER ROLE OF INTER-COMPETITOR SALES IN ANTITRUST 
ANALYSIS 
Inter-competitor sales among rival firms are a plus factor in antitrust 
analysis. This Part explains why and discusses how such sales are even more 
incriminating under some market conditions. Ironically, cartel managers 
understand the probative value of inter-competitor sales better than federal 
judges and try to avoid the need for inter-competitor sales precisely because 
it is indicative of price-fixing activity.194  
A. The Role of Inter-Competitor Sales in Plus-Factor Analysis 
Inter-competitor sales can play multiple roles in a plus-factor analysis. 
Such sales can be seen as a plus factor in and of themselves. But they can 
also help establish the existence of several other plus factors. 
1. Inter-Competitor Sales as an Independent Plus Factor 
Plus factors are essentially facts that increase the likelihood that the 
defendants’ parallel pricing or other suspicious conduct is the product of 
collusion and not independent decision-making by the defendant firms. For 
example, the Eleventh Circuit has defined plus factors as “any showing by 
appellants that ‘tend[s] to exclude the possibility of independent action.’”195 
The presence of inter-competitor sales satisfies this definition. 
Evidence of inter-competitor sales is an important plus factor for the 
reasons laid out in Part Three. Inter-competitor sales provide a mechanism 
for cartel managers to ensure that every member of the conspiracy receives 
its agreed-upon share of the cartel’s profits. By supplying a seemingly 
legitimate means of transferring money across co-conspirators, a buyback 
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scheme gives conspirators confidence in the cartel and less reason to cheat 
by selling more than their cartel allotment.  
Empirically, inter-competitor sales are often associated with cartel 
activity. From the legal European cartels of the inter-war era to the illegal 
conspiracies in citric acid, lysine, and vitamins of the 1990s, competitors 
intent on fixing prices have often employed inter-competitor sales as a 
means of stabilizing their market-manipulation arrangements. This 
historical record should translate into persuasive evidence in antitrust 
litigation. As economist John Connor concluded from his studies of the 
vitamins cartels:  
Even the best-intentioned criminals will exceed their grasp. 
Therefore, most of the vitamins cartels had compensation policies. 
Whenever a company exceeded its quota, that firm was obligated to 
sell the excess production at cost to an under-achiever in the cartel. 
Resale of the transferred product would restore the planned division 
of monopoly profits. Thus, increases in interfirm, intra-industry sales 
are indicators of cartel activity.196  
As an “indicator[] of cartel activity,” inter-competitor sales should be 
treated as an important plus factor. This accords with the conclusion of 
Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx’s major economic study of collusion that 
“[i]nterfirm transfers within a broad class of settings are inconsistent with 
unilateral conduct and, additionally, not part of tacit collusion by definition. 
Such transfers are a super-plus factor.”197  
Treating cartel inter-competitor sales as a plus factor facilitates the 
purposes of antitrust law more broadly. Antitrust law is designed to make 
price-fixing conspiracies less efficient and, thus, less likely.198 By treating 
the traditional mechanisms that cartels use to enforce their illegal 
conspiracies as plus factors, antitrust law can better hold price fixers 
accountable and, perhaps, deter price fixing in the first place. 
2. Inter-Competitor Sales as Proving Other Recognized Plus Factors  
Inter-competitor sales also implicate other established plus factors. For 
example, the opportunity to conspire is a recognized plus factor.199 If firms 
are engaging in inter-firm sales, this proves the rival firms are having direct 
discussions and negotiations, most worrisomely about price, which 
necessarily establishes the plus factor of opportunity to conspire. Similar 
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to—but more specific and damning than—mere opportunity to conspire, the 
exchange of price information among competitors is a plus factor from 
which a factfinder can infer an agreement to set prices.200 Inter-company 
sales give competitors an opportunity to communicate and to exchange price 
information.201 Indeed, one reason that price-fixing conspiracies may 
choose to use inter-competitor sales as their method of balancing the cartel’s 
books is that these—seemingly innocent—transactions “provide an avenue 
for interfirm communication about topics that specifically concern each 
firm’s price, customers, and capacity utilization.”202 In short, the presence 
of inter-competitor sales helps establish the plus factors of opportunity to 
conspire and the exchange of price information.  
Taking actions that would be against a firm’s individual interests in the 
absence of collusion is a powerful plus factor.203 Some courts have noted 
that conduct that “was not in the alleged conspirators’ independent self-
interest absent an agreement is generally considered the most important 
‘plus factor.’”204 Under some circumstances, inter-competitor sales can be 
interpreted as an action against a company’s independent interest. Indeed, 
some antitrust plaintiffs explicitly frame the defendants’ inter-company 
sales as “evidence of conduct contrary to self-interest.”205 How such sales 
are against at least one of the parties’ individual interests is a function of 
context. 
For inter-competitor sales, the defendants’ interests can be examined 
from the perspective of either the buyer or the seller. Depending on the 
specific circumstances, the transaction is arguably against the independent 
interests of a rival on one side of the transaction. For example, on the one 
hand, it is not in the interest of a firm with unsold inventory or excess 
capacity to buy products from a competitor. It is against the purchaser’s 
interest to give its money to its rivals for units of a product that it does not 
need. On the other hand, if the firm has neither inventory nor capacity and 
thus actually needs to purchase products from its rivals in order to make 
sales to consumers, it is against the vendor’s interest to sell the product to 
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its rival. After all, if the supply-depleted firm cannot make sales to its 
customer, that creates the opportunity for the firm’s competitors to make 
those sales.  
When courts sometimes explain why a firm may need to purchase 
products from a rival, they analyze the issue from the buyer’s perspective 
and decline to focus on the seller’s interests. For example, Judge Posner 
found 
nothing suspicious about a firm’s occasionally buying from a 
competitor to supply a customer whom the firm for one reason or 
another can’t at the moment supply. The firm would rather buy from 
a competitor to supply its customer than tell the customer to buy from 
the competitor, lest the customer never return.206  
While Judge Posner was trying to explain why inter-competitor sales may 
be innocuous, his reasoning explicates precisely why such sales are against 
the seller’s interest. The rational, non-colluding seller would prefer to steal 
its rivals’ customers. 
Courts generally fail to examine the rationality of inter-competitor sales 
from the seller’s perspective. For example, the Third Circuit in Valspar 
explained why DuPont apparently needed to purchase titanium dioxide from 
a rival. The court found the sale non-suspicious because Hurricane Katrina 
had “knocked out” one of DuPont’s titanium dioxide plants. But the court 
never addressed why DuPont’s rival agreed to sell titanium dioxide to its 
dominant competitor instead of trying to take the sales for itself and trying 
to convert DuPont’s customers into its own long-term customers.207 This 
sort of behavior—declining sales that one could take from a competitor—is 
classic cartel conduct.208 
When courts do consider the economic interests of the seller, they are 
more likely to recognize that, in many contexts, it is against the seller’s long-
term interests to help out a rival who is short of product. For example, in In 
re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litigation,209 one 
defendant, DSM, not only sold product to its rival, Exxon, but charged 
below-market prices.210 This is more consistent with price-fixing behavior 
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than with competition.211 The firm essentially forewent a customer sale at a 
more profitable price in order to aid its alleged competitor.212 DSM argued 
that the sale to its competitor was still profitable and that the “court should 
not second-guess its business judgment.”213 Yet, in an internal email before 
the sale took place, DSM “noted that the low ‘financial attractiveness of the 
deal is well understood’” and that the firm would rather not take “the risk 
of venturing into the market to compete for Exxon’s customers.”214 Such 
reasoning seems inconsistent with the founding principle of antitrust law, 
which is explicitly designed to encourage precisely that competition for 
customers. Indeed, DSM’s decision to sell product to Exxon instead of 
competing is particularly suspicious given that “Exxon appeared to be 
selling the DSM product to a DSM customer, who had begun purchasing 
less product from DSM itself.”215 The district court recognized that these 
inter-competitor sales were against the seller’s interest because “DSM 
agreed to forgo the potential for higher profits by selling its product on the 
open market, perhaps directly to Exxon customers, in order to permit Exxon 
to maintain its customer base.”216 In short, not competing for rivals’ 
customers is evidence of collusion. 
Thus, even if it is not suspicious that a rival would buy product from a 
competitor, it is suspicious that a competitor would sell to its rival—
especially at a below-market price—instead of trying to win the customer 
for itself and trying to convert this one-time customer into a long-term 
customer. These inter-competitor sales seem against the economic interest 
of the seller, but they are rational if both firms are in price-fixing conspiracy 
together.217 Because such sales make the most sense in the shadow of 
collusion, their presence is significant evidence of the plus factor of taking 
action against its own competitive interests. 
3. Evaluating Inter-Competitor Sales in the Context of Other Plus 
Factors 
The plus-factor framework requires the factfinder to review the 
plaintiffs’ proffered plus factors in the aggregate, not in isolation. 
Factfinders are supposed to analyze plus factors as a bundle. This is not 
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simply a matter of counting plus factors and crossing some numerical 
threshold. Plus factors should be analyzed in relation to one another.  
Taking the proper holistic approach is important because inter-
competitor sales are often one among several plus factors. For example, in 
In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation,218 the district court 
denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that the plaintiffs had 
presented a sufficient bundle of plus factors, including inter-competitor 
sales, as well as the use of trade association “meetings to facilitate and 
conceal communications in furtherance of the conspiracy, and using the 
[trade association] to transmit information among the co-conspirators.”219 
When combined with other evidence, intercompany sales agreements may 
indicate that rival firms have agreed to standardize contract terms on a range 
of issues, including price, delivery charges, and product standardization. For 
instance, in In re Plywood Antitrust Litigation,220 the Fifth Circuit approved 
a jury instruction explaining that while sales contracts between 
manufacturers of plywood “in and of themselves are not illegal,” the 
existence of “‘such matters may also be conduct that, when viewed on their 
own and in the light of the other evidence, indicate[s] that there were 
agreements’” among the defendants to illegally restrain competition.221 
Thus, while inter-competitor sales alone are not dispositive proof of price 
fixing, when combined with other plus factors,222 they can help make out a 
sufficient circumstantial case for inferring a price-fixing conspiracy.  
B. Facts that Increase the Probative Value of Inter-Competitor Sales as a 
Plus Factor 
Courts should not determine the probative value of inter-competitor sales 
in isolation from other evidence. The import of inter-competitor sales can 
increase significantly depending on the factual context of the sales. This 
                                                 
218. 261 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (C.D. Ill. 2003). 
219. Id. at 1020. 
220. 655 F.2d 627, 638 (5th Cir. 1981). 
221. In re Plywood, 655 F.2d at 637–38 (quoting District Court jury instructions). 
222. The Valspar majority both failed to appreciate the importance of inter-competitor sales as a 
plus factor and also failed to appreciate the entire constellation of plus factors in which the inter-
competitor sales resided. As Judge Stengel explained in dissent:  
Valspar presented a theory that makes perfect economic sense. It supported this theory with 
strong evidence of parallel conduct in the form of 31 (an unprecedented amount) of parallel 
price increase announcements. Recognizing conscious parallelism to be insufficient on its own 
to survive summary judgment, Valspar also presented viable evidence in support of the plus 
factors: (i) price signaling, (ii) exchanges of confidential information, (iii) relatively static 
market shares, (iv) intercompany sales of TiO2 at below market price, (v) abrupt departure 
from pre-conspiracy conduct, and (vi) a market susceptible to conspiracy. 












section reviews some of the background variables that can make inter-
competitor sales even more indicative of an underlying price-fixing 
conspiracy.  
1. Inter-Competitor Purchases By a Firm with Inventory or Excess 
Capacity 
Inter-competitor sales are more suspicious when the purchaser already 
has either inventory or excess capacity. A firm with stock on hand has no 
legitimate business need to purchase products from a rival. The most likely 
explanation for such a transaction is that it represents a simple transfer of 
money—a side payment camouflaged as a sale. Even if the purchaser does 
not have inventory immediately available, courts have explained that—
absent a conspiracy—a firm with excess capacity is better served by 
utilizing its own production facilities instead of purchasing products from 
rivals. In In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, Judge Posner 
explained: 
if the firm could supply its customer (remember there was a lot of 
excess capacity in the HFCS industry during the period of the alleged 
conspiracy) and at a lower cost than its competitor would charge, why 
would it buy from the competitor rather than expanding its own 
production? The possibility that springs immediately to mind is that 
this is a way of shoring up a sellers’ cartel by protecting the market 
share of each seller.223  
For a firm with excess capacity to purchase products from a rival is 
inconsistent with profit-maximizing unilateral conduct.224 Consequently, 
inter-rival sales under these circumstances “lead[] to the strong inference of 
collusion.”225 In short, a particularly strong plus factor is presented when a 
competitor purchases products from a rival even though the buyer has 
excess capacity.226 
                                                 
223. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 659 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis 
omitted). 
224. MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 58, at 229 (“If two firms in an oligopoly that make identical 
products have excess capacity to make such products, engage in transactions for that product at 
nonmarket prices, then those transactions are inconsistent with unilateral conduct.”). 
225. Kovacic et al., supra note 28 at 421. “In some circumstances, the observation that one seller 
buys output from another seller at market prices leads to the strong inference of collusion, such as when 
each seller has excess capacity, the product made by each seller is physically identical, and the value-
to-weight ratio of the product is high.” Id. at 423. 
226. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1024 (C.D. Ill. 2003) 
(noting the suspicious fact that “the Defendants purchased corn syrup from other manufacturers even 
though they had excess capacity.”). 










2. Inter-Competitor Sales Linked with Reporting Sales Data 
The first step of cartel management is monitoring each member’s sales 
in order to ensure that cartel commitments are being honored. Price-fixing 
conspiracies routinely establish systems to report sales in order to determine 
whether any firms have oversold and must compensate their under-selling 
cartel partners.227 John Connor reports that “[o]ne of the most common 
monitoring systems involves regular reporting of members’ sales or 
production levels to a designated cartel secretary.”228 In many cartels, the 
cartel manager then prepares “scorecards” for each member-firm to monitor 
which firms are on goal for meeting their cartel quotas.229 Cartel case studies 
illustrate the data-reporting systems of price-fixing conspiracies.230 Many 
cartels, such as the vitamin cartels, had their members report sales volume 
on a monthly basis.231 Other cartels shared their internal sales records at 
quarterly cartel meetings.232 
Although sharing data and engaging in inter-competitor sales are each 
suspicious behavior on their own, in combination they create an even 
stronger inference of collusion because the two separate acts can combine 
to form an overarching scheme of cartel enforcement. The sharing of data 
allows the cartel members and managers to determine which cartel partners 
have sold more or less than their cartel allotments. Cartel managers then use 
this data to match up oversellers and undersellers and instruct the former to 
purchase product from the latter. For example, the record-keepers of the 
citric acid cartel required Haarmann & Reimer to purchase 7,000 tons of 
citric acid from ADM.233 Because cartel buyback schemes require continual 
monitoring and coordination,234 when the exchange of sales data precedes 
the inter-competitor sales, the latter become an even stronger plus factor. It 
bears noting, however, that reporting sales data is a plus factor even without 
buybacks because one reason that cartels closely monitor sales is to adjust 
relative future sales in order to prevent the need for later buybacks 
altogether.235 
                                                 
227. Leslie, supra note 35, at 610–15. 
228. CONNOR, supra note 37, at 30. 
229. Id.  
230. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 48, at 835 (discussing graphite electrode cartel). 
231. CONNOR, supra note 37, at 281. 
232. Id. at 315. 
233. HARRINGTON, supra note 59, at 57–58. 
234. Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 36, at 836; see also HARRINGTON, supra note 59, at 58 
(discussing the citric acid and vitamins A and E cartels). 
235. HARRINGTON, supra note 59, at 58 (“It is noteworthy that cartels actively sought to avoid the 
necessity of buy-backs. [For example], the citric acid and vitamins A and E cartels engaged in 
‘continuous monitoring’ to assess how sales matched up with quotas and, where a firm was at a pace to 











3. Inter-Competitor Sales in a Market With Stable Market Shares 
When inter-competitor sales occur in a market with stable relative shares, 
this increases the suspect nature of these sales. Courts often consider stable 
market shares to be a plus factor.236 This is logical because many cartels fix 
the market shares of their participants in order to allocate the cartel’s 
profits.237 Many cartels use inter-competitor sales to stabilize market 
shares.238 Price-fixing conspiracies, such as the lysine and vitamin cartels, 
explicitly employed buyback schemes in order to preserve each 
conspirator’s agreed-upon market share.239 Buybacks are designed to lock 
in market shares in the long run240 because a firm, after all, has little 
incentive to sell more than its allotted market share if doing so will require 
it to purchase unneeded products from its rival cum cartel partner.241 If 
relative market shares are essentially stable and the market is one 
characterized by inter-competitor sales, this combination of factors is 
suspicious.242  
Market share data can also increase the probative value of inter-
competitor sales when certain patterns are discernible. Consider, for 
example, when such transactions follow a period of atypical market shares. 
Professor Joseph Harrington has explained that when one firm in an industry 
                                                 
236. See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2002). 
237. ERVIN HEXNER, INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 77 (1946) (“Many cartel agreements are based 
on determined marketing shares of participants.”). 
238. In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 959 F. Supp. 2d 799, 827–28 (D. Md. 2013). 
239. HARRINGTON, supra note 59, at 58 (vitamins A and E); LIEBER, supra note 106, at 148 
(lysine). 
240. A short-run—e.g., from one year to the next—fluctuation in market shares does not mean an 
absence of price fixing. Year-to-year market shares may change in a conspiracy because the conspirators 
have agreed to a compensation scheme where a cartel firm that oversells one year may receive a lower 
quota the following year. The sodium gluconate and zinc phosphate cartels employed such compensation 
mechanisms. HARRINGTON, supra note 59, at 61 (“A closely related alternative to buy-backs is to adjust 
the next year’s sales quotas based on the relationship between the current year’s sales and quotas. In the 
sodium gluconate cartel, if a firm’s sales exceeded its quota then its quota in the ensuing year would be 
reduced.”); id. at 62 (“An alternative form of compensation for having sold under a quota was to receive 
a bigger customer allocation. This was used in the zinc phosphate cartel.”). 
241. MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 63, at 121–22 (“[E]ach cartel member will want to stay on 
course to sell its market share, and nothing more, because selling more than its share will result in another 
firm selling less than its share and force the former firm to buy product from the latter at year end to 
‘true-up’ to the market share agreement.”). 
242. Id. at 230 (“[I]f the transaction leads to the same market shares this year for some group of 
firms as had existed in previous years, then such transactions are a super-plus factor.”); see also In re 
High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1020 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (discussing inter-
competitor sales in market where “Defendants[’] market shares were essentially stable, and substantial 
barriers prohibited other competitors from entering the corn syrup market.”).  
The Valspar dissent recognized the probative synergy of stable market shares and inter-competitor 
sales. Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2017) (Stengel, 
J., dissenting) (“Dovetailing with this evidence of static market shares is evidence that the TiO2 
manufacturers made intercompany sales of TiO2, meaning they sold TiO2 to one another.”). 










has sold more than its historical market share and another firm less, it is 
suspicious if the former firm subsequently purchases product from the latter 
in a manner that restores the historic market shares.243 As an economist, he 
labels this fact pattern a “collusive marker.” Lawyers would call it a plus 
factor. In short, timing and context can make inter-competitor sales more 
suspicious. 
4. Sales at Non-Market Prices 
When inter-competitor transactions occur at non-market prices, they are 
more probative of collusion. Sales between rivals at non-market prices 
necessarily redistribute money in a manner inconsistent with a competitive 
marketplace. Economists Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx explain that 
“[o]ne would not expect to see transactions at nonmarket prices in the 
absence of an overarching explicit agreement between the firms.”244 Inter-
competitor sales at non-market prices may be side payments designed to 
look like bona fide purchases. 
Whether the non-market prices are supra-competitive or below market, 
they are more probative of price fixing. On the one hand, inter-competitor 
sales at supra-competitive prices suggest that the transaction is a way of 
funneling excess money from the buyer to the seller. Professor Louis 
Kaplow explained how cartels can use “cross-purchases” to balance the 
cartel’s books because “a firm that sold more than its allotted share might 
buy from firms that sold less; if such purchases are at the elevated oligopoly 
price, compensation will have been accomplished.”245 Empirically, some 
cartels have used above-market prices on inter-competitor sales.246 Paying 
higher prices is especially suspicious when the purchaser can manufacture 
the product at a lower price than the purchase price it is paying its 
competitor, as occurred during the high fructose corn syrup price-fixing 
conspiracy.247 
Conversely, if the price of inter-competitor sales is below-market, this 
could suggest that the seller is surreptitiously transferring money to the 
buyer. Some cartels have required the over-selling cartel member to sell its 
product at cost to an under-selling partner, who could then resell it to its 
                                                 
243. HARRINGTON, supra note 59, at 60–61 (“Collusive Marker: In the previous period, firm i 
sells above its historical market share and firm j sells below its historical market share and, in the current 
period, there are large purchases by firm i from firm j.”). 
244. MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 58, at 128. 
245. Kaplow, supra note 44, at 394. 
246. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 48, at 835 (discussing the lysine cartel). 
247. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 659 (7th Cir. 2002) (“There 
is evidence that defendants bought HFCS from one another even when the defendant doing the buying 











customers at the inflated cartel price. Economist John Connor explained that 
cartels address the problem of cartel members missing their quotas  
by developing a compensation system whereby cartel members with 
excess sales transfer product at cost to those who undershot; the 
recipients then resell at the elevated cartel price, recouping lost 
profits in the next period. In effect, cartel members that sell more than 
their allotted share are penalized, thus providing deterrence for future 
violations of the share agreement.248  
Members of the vitamin cartel used precisely this system in which the inter-
competitor “sales were made at cost so that when the under-quota members 
resold the product at the cartel price, the excess profits made by the over-
quota firms in the previous year were in effect transferred to the under-quota 
buyer.”249 In addition to their compensatory function, sales at below-market 
prices can also stabilize a cartel because they resemble a goodwill gesture 
of the type that price fixers often use in order to maintain good relations 
among the cartel partners.250 
In short, the cartel member who sells more than its cartel allotment can 
compensate its underselling cartel partner by purchasing product from it at 
inflated prices or selling product to it at below-market prices. By effectively 
transferring money from one cartel member to another, both of these forms 
of non-market-priced transactions are suspicious. It is suspicious for a buyer 
to pay above-market prices. It is suspicious for a seller to charge below-
market prices. All inter-competitor sales at non-market prices are inherently 
suspicious.251 
None of the above discussion implies that inter-competitor sales at 
market prices are not indicative of price fixing. Such sales continue to have 
probative value because all inter-competitor sales have some probative 
value, since they can rebalance relative market shares among the cartel 
members.252 This section merely explains why sales at non-market prices 
have even more probative value. Inter-competitor sales at market prices are 
not exculpatory; they remain a plus factor that can help establish a 
                                                 
248. CONNOR, supra note 37, at 31. 
249. Id. at 281. 
250. Leslie, supra note 35, at 568–73. Also, if the defendants are selling product to each other at 
below-market prices, that shows that the market is not competitive because in a competitive market the 
prevailing price would just cover costs and sellers could not sell below the market price without 
sustaining a loss. 
251. Kovacic et al., supra note 28, at 423 (“In addition, if one seller buys anything from another 
at nonmarket prices, then a resource transfer is made for which there is no reasonable noncollusive 
explanation”). 
252. MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 58, at 230 (explaining how “transactions at market prices” 
can “facilitate[] explicit collusion”). 










circumstantial case for inferring an agreement among competitors to fix 
prices. 
5. The Role of Independent Justifications for Inter-Competitor Sales 
The probative value of inter-competitor sales increases when defendants 
cannot explain why they engaged in such transactions. The Supreme Court 
has long held that price-fixing defendants’ failure to explain suspicious 
activity is evidence of collusion.253 Consequently, if the defendants fail to 
proffer any independent, non-collusive explanation for their inter-
competitor sales, that significantly increases the probative value of such 
sales for inferring a conspiracy.254 
Conversely, the probative value of inter-competitor sales decreases if the 
defendants can present a non-collusive explanation for their suspicious 
conduct that is believed by the factfinder.  
Price-fixing defendants may try to advance an independent justification 
for their inter-competitor sales in an effort to prove that the sales transpired 
for reasons unrelated to any alleged collusion.255 For example, defendants 
could use data and contemporary documentation to show that mutual inter-
rival sales reduced transportation costs given the relative locations of firms 
to their customers.256 However, while the absence of a proffered justification 
is strong evidence of collusion, courts should not automatically defer to 
explanations offered by defendants, which the Valspar court improperly 
did.257 Any justification must be non-pretextual, and plaintiffs must have an 
opportunity to explain to the jury that the defendants’ explanation is 
                                                 
253. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). 
254. Kovacic et al., supra note 28, at 423 (“In summary, if firms engage in interfirm transfers of 
resources that are largely void of productive unilateral motivations for one or both of the parties, then 
these transactions are super plus factors.”). 
255. See MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 58, at 230 (discussing hypothetical efficiency 
justification for inter-competitor sales). 
256. See id. at 128 (“A firm might be able to save on transportation costs by purchasing product 
from a manufacturer that is closer to its end customer rather than producing the output itself and then 
transporting it.”). Marshall and Marx also observe, however, that “if proximity to the customer 
represents a substantial comparative advantage, then one would generally expect competitive bidding 
between the producers to result in each producer winning the business of the customer closest to it.” Id. 
at 129. 
257. Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 201 (3d Cir. 2017) (giving 
dispositive weight to “DuPont’s reasonable explanations” for its inter-competitor sales). The issue is not 
whether DuPont’s explanations are reasonable; the issue is whether or not explanations are true. That is 











untrue.258 Further, the defendants’ proffering of a pretextual explanation for 
their inter-competitor sales is itself evidence of collusion.259 
The ability of defendants to present independent justifications for their 
inter-competitor sales should minimize any risk that antitrust law could 
deter beneficial conduct. While some firms may argue that treating inter-
competitor sales as a significant plus factor may deter firms from engaging 
in perfectly efficient inter-competitor sales, such concerns should not 
dissuade courts from attaching appropriate probative value to inter-
competitor sales, which are commonly associated with price fixing. First, 
rival firms can still buy and sell products from each other so long as the 
transactions are unrelated to any collusive activity. Treating conduct as a 
plus factor does not render that conduct illegal.260 Second, firms can 
minimize the risk that their inter-competitor sales will be incorrectly 
interpreted as evidence of price-fixing activity. For example, firms would 
be wise to document—contemporaneous with the sale—why the transaction 
makes sense for each party for reasons unrelated to any tendency of such 
sales to facilitate collusion.261 Third, the likelihood of antitrust liability 
attaching to innocent defendants as a result of truly innocuous inter-
competitor sales is very low. Defendants will only be found liable when 
their inter-competitor sales are preceded by consistent parallel price changes 
over a period of time and are accompanied by other plus factors that indicate 
those parallel prices are the product of collusion, not independent decision-
making.  
In sum, in the absence of an underlying price-fixing conspiracy, firms 
can still engage in inter-competitor sales when it is in their independent 
interests to do so. Appreciating the probative value of inter-competitor sales 
should do no harm to innocent firms that can explain their conduct.  
CONCLUSION 
Inter-competitor sales are inherently a plus factor in proving a price-
fixing agreement through circumstantial evidence. While they are not direct 
proof of conspiracy, they are fundamentally suspicious because such sales 
do not generally occur in competitive markets and yet do commonly take 
                                                 
258. See id. at 211–12 (Stengel, J., dissenting) (“The majority, like the District Court, accepted 
each of DuPont’s explanations of possibly conspiratorial conduct and adopted each without much 
explanation. This approach should be unacceptable at the summary judgment stage.”); see also id. at 
203 (“I think there are enough factual issues in this case that the question whether it was a lawful 
coincidence or an unlawful agreement should be decided by a jury.”). 
259. Fragale & Sons Beverage Co. v. Dill, 760 F.2d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 1985) (offering pretextual 
explanations for suspicious conduct “would disprove the likelihood of independent action.”). 
260. Christopher R. Leslie, Foreign Price-Fixing Conspiracies, 67 DUKE L.J. 557, 597–600 
(2017) (explaining the relationship between legality and plus factors). 
261. That may seem like a burden—and it is—but it is a reasonable one. 










place in cartelized markets. Furthermore, the probative value of evidence of 
such sales increases when the sales occur in the context of other plus factors 
that indicate the inter-competitor sales may be part of a larger program 
among the defendants to fix price, monitor their cartel agreement, and 
punish cheaters or otherwise balance the cartel’s books. 
Defendants must be given an opportunity to explain why their inter-
competitor sales have an innocent origin, unrelated to the illegal fixing of 
prices. Such explanations will generally be fact specific. However, the 
defendants’ proffered justifications for these sales should not be simply 
accepted as true, especially when the defendant has moved for summary 
judgment because at that stage all evidence is to be interpreted in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs. Judges, like those in the Third Circuit’s 
Valspar litigation, may be tempted to analyze the defendants’ explanation 
for their inter-competitor sales in isolation from the other evidence 
presented by the plaintiffs. This is a mistake. It is not the function of judges 
to decide before a trial has taken place which party’s explanation of these 
sales is accurate as a matter of law. 
It is for the jury to determine whether—based on the evidence as a 
whole—the inter-competitor sales are more likely part of a price-fixing 
conspiracy or innocuous transactions between non-conspirators. Plaintiffs 
should have the opportunity to cross-examine the defendants about the 
details and rationale for their inter-competitor sales. Plaintiffs should have 
the ability to ask about the timing, the frequency, and the negotiations of all 
inter-competitor sales. In particular, plaintiffs’ counsel may ask why a firm 
is purchasing products from a rival when the purchaser has excess capacity 
and can manufacture the product more cheaply than the sales prices in the 
inter-rival transactions. Where applicable, plaintiffs should ask why the 
inter-competitor sales are taking place at non-market prices. Defendants 
should have both the opportunity and the obligation to explain these details 
under oath to the factfinders, the jurors. But the jury’s deliberations should 
be informed by the opinions of expert witnesses who understand how cartels 
have historically employed inter-competitor sales and who can explain why 
such sales may be indicative of an underlying price-fixing conspiracy.  
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